Prof. Shira Elqayam, De Montfort University, Leicester

Abstract

The accepted wisdom in dual process theory is that people are cognitive misers: they hold back from investing cognitive effort, thus falling prey to bias and error. The conclusion seems simple: To be rational, invest more cognitive effort. However, this seemingly simple conclusion glosses over an implicit chain of enthymematic inference:

1. Correct responding equals normative responding
2. Cognitive resources are necessary (although not always sufficient) for correct responding
3. People do have the necessary cognitive resources, but –
4. – they satisfice, that is to say, they invest just enough resources and no more (cognitive miserliness)
5. Satisficing leads to bias and error
6. To respond correctly, we need to invest cognitive effort

Earlier work has already challenged many of these steps (e.g., Elqayam & Evans, 2011; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2996; Thompson & Johnson, 2014). However, the premise that people do indeed satisfice (step 4) has usually been accepted as an article of faith. Authors either deplore satisficing or celebrate it, but seldom doubt it. In this talk, I will focus on step 4. I will draw on a parallel corpus of literature, research in metacognition, which explores the way that people monitor and regulate cognitive processes. Although the roots of research in metacognition go back to the heuristics and biases research paradigm, its relevance for rationality went largely unnoticed. I will draw on evidence from metacognition to argue that people are not always cognitive misers. Indeed, the evidence shows that cognitive wastefulness might be as common as cognitive miserliness. I explore the implications of this evidence for bounded and grounded rationality.